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The commonwealth court held that the DOT's conduct in
improving the Route and depositing sediment in the Creek did not
artificially or unnecessarily alter the Creek's natural channel, nor had
it increased the Creek's flow. Therefore, under the common enemy
doctrine, the DOT was not liable for damages caused by the Creek's
flooding.
Steven j Rypma

TENNESSEE
Keltner v. Open Lake Sporting Club, No. W2002-00449-COA-R3-CV,
2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2003) (holding
that genuine issues of material fact over ownership of a watercourse
exist where a landowner establishes ownership of property abutting
the watercourse; the opposing party has an ambiguous deed; and parol
evidence does not prove ownership through recognition).
The controversy in this case arose over ownership of a portion of
Right Hand Arm, a water body flowing from Open Lake. Open Lake
Sporting Club ("OLSC") owned the majority of Open Lake. A portion
of Right Hand Arm flowed through property owned by Mrs. Keltner.
OLSC and Mrs. Keltner both assumed they owned Right Hand Arm.
Mrs. Keltner believed that she owned Right Hand Arm and had merely
leased use of it to OLSC. Likewise, OLSC believed it owned Right
Hand Arm and had leased hunting rights on Mrs. Keltner's property.
In 1995, Mrs. Keltner leased use of Right Hand Arm to a third party.
Shortly thereafter, a dispute arose between Mrs. Keltner and OLSC
over Right Hand Arm ownership. Mrs. Keltner commenced a suit
requesting a declaratory judgment to quiet title and to determine Mrs.
Keltner's right to the portion of Right Hand Arm located on Mrs.
Keltner's property. The Chancery Court for Lauderdale County
granted summary judgment to OLSC. Mrs. Keltner appealed to the
Court of Appeals of Tennessee.
First, the appellate court concluded that under the doctrine of
riparian rights, even though Mrs. Keltner owned property adjacent to
Right Hand Arm, that fact alone did not establish she owned the
portion of Right Hand Arm that flowed through her property. The
doctrine of riparian rights provides that landowners have the right to
use water abutting their property, unless the right-to-use the
watercourse is specifically reserved in the deed. However, the doctrine
only presumes a right of use and does not presume ownership of the
water. Hence, Mrs. Keltner's ownership of property abutting Right
Hand Arm only established a right of use.
Secondly, the court concluded trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to OLSC because genuine issues of material fact
existed regarding OLSC's ownership of the portion of Right Hand
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Arm located on Mrs. Keltner's property. The doctrine of riparian
rights presumes the interest of the riparian owner passes to the
grantee when the grantor conveys the upland. OLSC argued that A
Booth Company ("ABC") conveyed the disputed portion of Right
Hand Arm to them. However, the court concluded, based on
testimony of a land surveyor, there was no way to determine what land
ABC actually conveyed to OLSC. Furthermore, in order to determine
ownership, the court concluded it was necessary to determine whether
ABC owned the disputed portion of Right Hand Arm and whether
ABC conveyed the disputed portion of Right Hand Arm to OLSC.
Finally, the court concluded parol evidence was admissible to.
determine whether Mrs. Keltner acquired ownership by agreement
with OLSC because the deeds were ambiguous. Mrs. Keltner argued
that minutes from an OLSC meeting proved OLSC recognized Mrs.
Keltner owned the disputed portion of Right Hand Arm. However,
the court concluded this evidence showed that OLSC recognized Mrs.
Keltner owned the land surrounding the disputed portion of Right
Hand Arm but that genuine issues of material fact still existed as to
whether OLSC recognized Mrs. Keltner owned that portion of Right
Hand Arm.
For the foregoing reasons, the court concluded the trial court
erred because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the
ownership of Right Hand Arm.
HeatherChamberlain

TEXAS
Sabine River Auth. of Texas v. Hughes, 92 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.
2002) (holding a claim for inverse condemnation requires the
claiming party to allege that the government intended its action to
result in a taking).
Paul Hughes ("Hughes") brought an inverse condemnation suit
against the Sabine River Authority of Texas ("Authority"). The First
District Court of Newton City granted Hughes' motion for summary
judgment, holding that the Authority's intentional release of reservoir
water resulted in a taking of Hughes' land for public use. The Texas
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, and affirmed the
Authority's motion for summary judgment.
Hughes alleged that the Authority's intentional release of reservoir
water into the Sabine River caused Hughes' land to be flooded and
resulted in a taking. The Texas Court of Appeals ruled that Hughes'
complaint was insufficient to support a claim of inverse condemnation.
A claim for inverse condemnation required Hughes to allege the
Authority intended its release of water to result in a taking. The court
found as a matter of law that the facts of the case did not warrant a

